Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti argue that the importance of TRIPS in the process of generating and disseminating knowledge and innovation has been overestimated by its proponents. This has been supported by the United Nations` findings, which indicate that many low-protection countries currently benefit from significant foreign direct investment (FDI).  Analysis of OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (during which the patent term of medicines was extended by 6 years) showed that, although the total number of registered products increased slightly, the average innovation index remained unchanged.  In contrast, Jörg Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser (2017)  find historical evidence that, in certain circumstances, compulsory licensing – a key mechanism for weakening intellectual property rights under Article 31 of TRIPS – can indeed be effective in promoting inventions by increasing the threat of competition in areas with low reservations. However, they argue that the benefits of weakening intellectual property rights depend heavily on the credible ability of governments to use them only in exceptional emergencies, given that companies can invest less in research and development while expecting repeated episodes of compulsory licensing. The 2002 Doha Declaration reaffirmed that the TRIPS Agreement should not prevent members from taking the necessary measures to protect public health. Despite this recognition, less developed countries have argued that flexible TRIPS provisions, such as compulsory licensing, are almost impossible to enforce. Less developed countries, in particular, cited their young domestic manufacturing and technology industries as evidence of the imprecision of the policy. Since the entry into force of TRIPS, it has been the subject of criticism from developing countries, scientists and non-governmental organizations. .